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The domain of quantum technologies has been recently broaden to satellites orbiting the earth.
Long distances communication protocols cannot ignore the presence of the gravitational field and
its effects on the quantum states. Here, we provide a general method to investigate how grav-
ity affects the performance of various quantum key distribution protocols for continuous variable
states of localized wave packets. We show that the consequences of gravity strongly depend on the
configuration and the cryptographic scheme used.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Quantum key distribution (QKD) is one of the most
important applications of quantum information theory.
The two fundamental protocols, one by Bennet and Bras-
sard [1], the other by Ekert [2], have been extended to the
realm of continuos variable (CV) systems and Gaussian
states. The first protocol is based on a scheme where
a state is prepared, sent and measured. The second is
based on entanglement shared between the parties. It
has been shown that the two schemes are equivalent [3].
There are four standard protocols in Gaussian QKD: Al-
ice prepares squeezed states with a Gaussian modula-
tion along one of the two quadratures, sends them to
Bob who measures them by performing homodyne detec-
tion [4]; Alice prepares coherent states, Gaussian modu-
lated along both quadratures, with Bob performing again
homodyne detection [5]; a third is where Alice sends
squezeed states and Bob applies now heterodyne detec-
tion [8]; finally, the fourth protocol where Alice prepares
coherent states and Bob heterodynes them [6]. Here, we
refer mostly to the reasoning described in [7], where the
authors address the problem of secrecy against individual
attacks in the entanglement based (EB) scenario, and in
his extension to collective attacks detailed in [8]. Detailed
reviews about QKD and Gaussian quantum information
can be found in [9] and [10].
Performing such quantum protocols with satellites can
allow for an application of such techniques to global
scales. To account for all the physical phenomena that af-
fect the photons is a difficult task and the effect of gravity
must have some importance over long distance quantum
communication, which is a working technology already
[11, 12]. The effect of gravity can be taken into account
as a curved dynamical background which modifies the
equations of quantum field theory. This, has non-trivial
effects even on fundamental phenomena such as the de-
cay rate of unstable particles [13]. Furthermore, gravity
is locally equivalent to non-inertial motion according to
∗Electronic address: robpierin@gmail.com
the equivalence principle. Therefore, the effect of grav-
ity on quantum states can be analogously studied as the
effect of the acceleration of the observer on the quan-
tum states. While this is a well known fact since several
decades [14], there have been some controversy during
the years in the study of the Unruh effect in connection
to standard quantum information tasks [15]. Infact, it
has been clarified only recently how Gaussian states are
properly affected by acceleration. The efforts have cul-
minated in the work [16], whose method has been suc-
cesfully extended [17] and applied to CV quantum in-
formation protocols [18]. Several previous works [19–21]
have meaningfully investigated the effect of the accelera-
tion on a specific cryptographic scheme, where only one
of the parties was allowed to accelerate, and the effect
of gravity on information transmission [22–24]. Here, we
aim to extend those studies to various QKD schemes and
to the general scenario in which both Alice and Bob are
affected by acceleration or gravity.
In Sec. II we give a description of a general protocol
for QKD with CV and his security condition in terms
of key rates. In Sec. III is described how the covari-
ance matrix of two localized wave packets changes when
they are observed from a non inertial frame. In Sec. IV
we study the influence of acceleration on the previously
described protocol, in particular on the efficiency in dis-
tributing the secret key. Finally, we conclude with some
comments in Sec. V.
II. QKD WITH CONTINUOUS VARIABLES
A standard protocol of CV QKD in the EB represen-
tation can be briefly described as follows. In the first
step, Alice prepares a two mode squeezed vacuum state
and sends one of the mode to Bob. Both Alice and Bob
measure randomly either the x or the p quadrature of
their share of the entangled state. After this, they per-
form the so-called sifting procedure where they drop the
data which are outcomes of the measurements in differ-
ent bases. Eve interacts with the quantum system to
learn about the key. This action modifies the state in a
way that can be observed. Therefore, in the next step
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2the reliable parties reveal each other a randomly chosen
sample of their data, in order to estimate the param-
eters of the channel and, consequently, the amount of
information leaked to Eve. After sifting and parameters
estimation, Alice and Bob share a string of correlated
elements, called raw key. In the subsequent step they ex-
tract a common binary key from the data using classical
communication. Depending on whether Alice’s or Bob’s
data are used, the protocol is called direct reconciliation
(DR) or reverse reconciliation (RR) respectively. Finally,
they perform error correction and privacy amplification
to get a perfectly correlated key.
The standard procedure is to assume that Eve does
a passive attack, where she replaces the real connection
between Alice and Bob by a unitary operation that mim-
ics the channel between them when we trace out Eve’s
modes. This operation is represented by a thermal noise
channel of transmittance T and noise referred to the in-
put χ. In practice, it can be implemented by a beam
splitter of transmittance T , where the signal sent to Bob
is combined with a thermal state of zero mean and vari-
ance 〈Xˆ2th〉 = T1−T χ,
XˆB =
√
T XˆA +
√
1− T Xˆth , (1)
where χ is the noise referred to the input of the channel
χ =
1− T
T
+ ε , (2)
and ε the so-called excess noise. This attack is known
as intercept and resend or cloning attack. To establish
whether the set of binary symbols created in the protocols
can be used in the encription task, the honest parties have
to evaluate the so-called secret key rate K. We consider
the two cases of individual attacks (IA) and collective
attacks (CA) by Eve, which result in two different key
rates. In the case of individual attacks, Eve measures
her ancillas before the classical postprocessing, so that at
the beginning of it, Alice, Bob and Eve share a product
probability distribution of classical symbols. In this case
we have that
KDR = I(a, b)− I(a,E) ,
KRR = I(a, b)− I(b, E) , (3)
where I(a, b) is the mutual information between the vari-
ables of Alice and Bob, and I(a,E) ( I(b, E)) is the mu-
tual information between Alice (Bob) and Eve. For col-
lective attacks, Eve keeps her ancillas in a quantum mem-
ory untill the end of the classical postprocessing, when
she then performs an optimal collective measurement
KDR = I(a, b)− S(a,E) ,
KRR = I(a, b)− S(b, E) , (4)
where now S(a,E) (S(b, E)) is the Holevo bound on Eve’s
accessible information.
It is possible to describe in a unifed way the different
cases where homodyne or heterodyne measurements are
performed. Including a beam splitter of transmissivity
TA (TB) at Alice’s (Bob) side, where the ancillary mode
is in the vacuum state of variance V (0) = 1, we easily
find the modified variances and correlations
VATA = TAVA + 1− TA ,
VBTB = TBVB + 1− TB ,
〈XˆATA XˆBTB 〉 =
√
TATB 〈XˆAXˆB〉 .
(5)
Homodyne detection is recovered for TA = 1 (TB = 1),
while heterodyning corresponds to TA = 1/2 (TB = 1/2).
It has been shown that the four possible measurements
correspond to the four different protocols mentioned in
the introduction, in which Alice sends either squeezed
states or coherent states, while Bob measures them with
one of the two different techniques [8]. The mutual infor-
mation between Alice and Bob is given by the following
equation
I(a, b) =
1
2
log
(
VATA
VATA |BTB
)
, (6)
and the conditional variances are given by
VATA |BTB = 〈Xˆ2AT 〉 −
〈XˆAT XˆBT 〉
〈Xˆ2
BT
〉 =

VA|B if TA = TB = 1 ,
VAM |B = 12 (VA|B + 1) if TA =
1
2 , TB = 1 ,
VA|BM =
VA
VB+1
(VB|A + 1) if TA = 1 , TB = 12 ,
VAM |BM =
VA
2(VB+1)
(VB|A + 1) + 12 if TA =
1
2 , TB =
1
2
(7)
The letter M means that the heterodyne measurement is
performed. It has been proved that cloning attacks are
optimal and saturate the bounds in (3) and (4) for the
first three protocols, both for IA and CA. Therefore, we
will consider only them in what follows.
3A. Individual attacks
In the case of individual attacks Eve’s information for
DR is easily computed as
I(a,E) =
1
2
log
(
VATA
VATA |E
)
, (8)
where, according to whether Alice performs homodyne
or heterodyne measurement we have
VATA |E = TAVA|E + 1− TA
=
{
VA|E if TA = 1 ,
VAM |E = 12 (VA|E + 1) if TA =
1
2 .
(9)
In the case of RR we need VBTB |ATA and VBTB |E . It is
enough to exchange A with B in the Eq. (7) and (9).
B. Collective attacks
For collective attacks the Holevo bound in DR is given
by
S(a,E) = S(E)− S(E|a) . (10)
Assuming that Eve holds the purification of the state al-
lows us to write S(E) = S(AB) and S(E|a) = S(B|a),
so that Eve’s accessible information is a function of the
entropic quantities of Alice and Bob only. In the EB sce-
nario Alice prepares an EPR state (two modes squeezed
vacuum) [8, 10] of zero mean
d(in) = (0, 0) (11)
and covariance matrix
σAA′ =
[
V I
√
V 2 − 1σz√
V 2 − 1σz V I
]
, (12)
with σz being the Pauli matrix. After one mode is sent
to Bob through the noisy channel introduced by Eve
NA′→B(σAA′) = σAB , the covariance matrix of the out-
put can be easily computed using (1)
σAB =
[
x I z σz
z σz y I
]
=
[
V I
√
T (V 2 − 1)σz√
T (V 2 − 1)σz T (V + χ) I
]
,
(13)
that is x = VA and y = VB . Given a two modes covari-
ance matrix
σAB =
[
A C
CT B
]
, (14)
where A and B are 2 × 2 covariance matrices of the re-
spective subsystems and C is the correlation matrix, we
have that
S(AB) = g(λ1) + g(λ2) , (15)
where λ1,2 are the symplectic eigenvalues of (14), given
by
λ21,2 =
1
2
(
∆±
√
∆2 − 4D2
)
,
∆ = detA+ detB + 2 detC ,
D = detσAB ,
(16)
and
g(x) =
(
x+ 1
2
)
log2
(
x+ 1
2
)
−
(
x− 1
2
)
log2
(
x− 1
2
)
.
(17)
Also, we have that
S(B|a) = g(λ3) , (18)
λ3 being the symplectic eigenvalue of Bob’s covariance
matrix σB|a, given Alice’s measurement outcome,
λ3 =
√
det(σB|a) . (19)
When Alice performs a homodyne measurement on her
mode, which gives a as result, she projects Bob’s mode
on a state with mean
dB|a = CT (A
−1
11 Π) dA =
√
1− 1/V 2 (a, 0) , (20)
and covariance matrix
σB|a = B − C (A−111 Π)CT , (21)
where Π = diag(1, 0) and dA is Alice’s measurement re-
sult. Note that this is a squeezed state displaced along
the x quadrature. In the case of RR protocol we simply
have to compute S(A|b), which is done replacing a with
b in the Eq. (18).
The information leaked to Eve is harder to compute for
the other two protocols. In the case of coherent states
and homodyne detection we attach the ancillary mode C
at Alice’s side. The covariance matrix of the three modes
reads
σACB =
(1/2)(x+ 1) I (1/2)(1− x) I
√
1/2 z σz
(1/2)(1− x) I (1/2)(x+ 1) I −√1/2 z σz√
1/2 z σz −
√
1/2 z σz y I
 .
(22)
Now, the mutual information can be easily computed in-
serting in (6) the variances from (5) and (7) correspond-
ing to the cases TA = 0.5 and TB = 1. Also, while the
Holevo bound of RR, S(b, E) = S(E)−S(E|b), is exactly
the same as that for squeezed states and homodyne de-
tection - (15) less (18) with a ↔ b - the same problem
for DR is more subtle because of the ancillary mode at
Alice’s side. The function S(E) is still given by (15) but,
S(E|a) = S(CB|a) has now to be computed from the
6× 6 covariance matrix σBC|a. The result is [8]
S(CB|a) = g(λ4) + g(λ5) , (23)
4where the symplectic eigenvalues λ4,5 are calculated
again using the formula (16). For squeezed states and
heterodyne detection we have to take into account the
ancillary mode C at Bob’s side. The covariance matrix
is now
σABC =
 x I
√
1/2 z σz −
√
1/2 z σz√
1/2 z σz (1/2)(y + 1) I (1/2)(1− y)I
−√1/2 z σz (1/2)(1− y) I (1/2)(y + 1) I
 ,
(24)
The mutual information (6) has to be computed for
TA = 1 and TB = 0.5. In the case of DR Eve’s infor-
mation on Alice measurements is again the same as in
DR for squeezed states and homodyne detection, (15)
less (18). To find Eve’s accessible information S(b, E) =
S(E)−S(E|b) in RR, we need to find σAC|b and S(AC|b).
The result is that it is enough to change x with y in the
eigenvalues λ4,5.
Now that we have all the standard machinery, we can
move to the problem of how gravity affects the ability of
Alice and Bob to perform QKD. To do so, we will assume
that Alice and Bob start moving with acceleration AI
and AII , respectively.
III. EFFECT OF THE ACCELERATION ON
GAUSSIAN STATES
We want to study the previously described protocols in
the non-inertial scenario. The two reliable parties, Alice
and Bob, are now allowed to accelerate independently
one from the other. Let us consider two wave packets
φΛ in the inertial frame, where Λ ∈ {I, II}, and two
wave packets ψΛ in the non inertial frame. These, are
assumed to be localized and composed of positive fre-
quencies centered around Ω0. In particular, the size L
of the accelerating modes have to be small enough to al-
low the attribution of a unique proper acceleration AΛ,
1/AΛ  L. Also, they have to be far from the event
horizon and satisfy Ω0  1/L, which makes the contri-
bution from negative frequencies negligible. A possible
choice of the modes has been proposed in [25, 26]. In the
inertial frame they are
φΛ(x, 0) = ±C e−2(
x0
L log
x
x0
)2 sin
(√
Ω20 −m2(x− x0)
)
,
∂tφΛ(x, 0) = −iΩ0 φΛ(x, 0) ,
(25)
for a wave packet centered around x0. An accelerated
reference frame in 1 + 1 spacetime is properly described
by the Rindler coordinates (η, χ)
t = χ sinh(aη) , x = χ cosh(aη) , (26)
where a is a positive parameter and (t, x) are the
Minkowski coordinates. In Rindler coordinates, the
mode functions are, accordingly, given by
ψΛ(χ, 0) = ±C e−2(
x0
L
log( χ
x0
))2
×=
{
I−iΩ0
A
(m|x0|)I iΩ0
A
(m|χ|)
}
∂τψΛ(χ, 0) = ∓ iΩ0 ψΛ(χ, 0) ,
(27)
where Iiν(x) is the modified Bessel function of the first kind.
Now, we need to properly describe how quantum states are
transformed from one reference frame to the other. The most
convincing and also flexible tool in this sense has been de-
veloped in [16], where the authors were able to formulate
the transformation in terms of a quantum channel acting
on the covariance matrix of a two mode Gaussian states
N (σ(f)) = σ(d),
X(d) = MX(f) ,
σ(d) = Mσ(f)MT +N ,
(28)
where M and N are 4 × 4 real matrices and N describes
the noise present in the quantum channel. Here, f and d
refer to the inertial modes φΛ and to the accelerated modes
ψΛ, respectively. The vector of first moments is defined as
~X(i) =
{
qˆ
(i)
I , pˆ
(i)
I , qˆ
(i)
II , pˆ
(i)
II
}
, i ∈ {f, d}. The Bogolubov trans-
formations between the two set of modes, from one reference
frame to the other, depend on the mode overlap
dˆΛ = (ψΛ, φΛ)fˆΛ + (ψΛ, φ
∗
Λ)fˆ
†
Λ . (29)
Defining
αΛ = (ψΛ, φΛ) ,
βΛ = −(ψΛ, φ∗Λ) , (30)
from the first of the (28) the M matrix can be easily found
to be
M =

<(αI − βI) −=(αI + βI) 0 0
=(αI − βI) <(αI + βI) 0 0
0 0 <(αII − βII) −=(αII + βII)
0 0 =(αII − βII) <(αII + βII)
 .
(31)
Regarding the noise matrix N , being more tricky to calculate,
we refer the reader to [16]. Here, we mention only that for
squeezed states, with sufficiently large squeezing parameters,
as input to the channel, the βΛ coefficients can be neglected,
being several orders of magnitude smaller than the αΛ. We
assume to work inside this range, and the matrices simplify
in
M = αII ⊕ αIII , (32)
and
N = (1− α2I)I ⊕ (1− α2II)I . (33)
IV. KEY RATES IN NON INERTIAL FRAMES
Applying to (13) the channel (28), with (32) and (33), gives
the following covariance matrix
σ
(d)
AB =
[
r I t σz
t σz s I
]
, (34)
where
r = α2I x+ (1− α2I) ,
s = α2II y + (1− α2II) ,
t = αIαII z .
(35)
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FIG. 1: Density plot of the ratio K(AI ,AII)/K(0), for DR and IA, vs AI and AII . The parameters are ε = 0.0, V = 20 and
l = 0.5.
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FIG. 2: Density plot of the ratio K(A1,A2)/K(0), for RR and IA, vs AI and AII . The parameters are ε = 0.0, V = 20 and
l = 0.5.
As a consequence, the effect of gravity on the protocols can
be accounted for simply exchanging the quantities x, y and
z with r, s and z. This holds for all the cases previosly dis-
cussed, both in IA and CA regime. The quantities αI and αII
are the Bogoliubov coefficients defined in (30) and computed
in the paper [16]. An important detail has to be underlined:
we are here assuming that only the modes A and B are accel-
erating, while the ancilla C is inertial. The results are shown
in the two following sections.
A. Individual attacks
The key rate of individual attacks, for DR and RR, are
given by the difference between the equations (6) and (8).
We have
KDR =
1
2
log2
VA|E
VA|B
, (36)
KRR =
1
2
log2
VB|E
VB|A
. (37)
The conditional variances for the accelerated modes are ob-
tained introducing the quantities (35) into (7) and (9); they
can be written in a compact form as
V
(d)
ATA |BTB =
α2I VAT
VBT +
1
α2
II
− 1
(
V
(f)
BTB |ATA +
1
α2II
− 1
)
+1−α2I ,
(38)
and
V
(d)
ATA |E = α
2
I V
(f)
ATA |E + 1− α
2
1 . (39)
where V
(f)
BTB |ATA and V
(f)
ATA |E are defined in the equations (7)
and (9). The variances of Bob, given Alice or Eve measure-
ments, can be calculated simply switching A with B and I
with II.
The results, in the case of individual attacks, are summa-
rized in the plots. Fig. (1) and (2) show the key rates (3)
normalized to one (which corresponds to the inertial case) as
a function of Alice and Bob’s acceleration, for DR and RR re-
spectively. Not surprisingly, the acceleration erodes the abil-
ity of the two parties to perform QKD in all the protocols.
We can note that the degradation effect is almost symmet-
ric respect to Alice and Bob’s acceleration only for squeezed
states and homodyne detection, both in DR and in RR. The
other protocols are not symmetric and Alice and Bob’s accel-
eration degrades the key with a different rate. Fig. (3) shows
the key rates of the different protocols as a function of the
loss l [27] for DR and RR respectively, and with fixed vari-
ance of the initial shared entangled state V and fixed noise
ε. Next to each curve is represented the key rate of the rel-
ative protocol when Alice is undergoing a given acceleration
and Bob is inertial (dashed lines), AI 6= 0 and AII = 0. We
note that the rate is generally lower in the non-inertial case,
but, interestingly, in DR the maximal communication length
is not affected. This interesting feature is lost when also Bob
is accelerating and the transmission length becomes shorter.
In RR the length is confirmed to be virtually infinite, but the
rate is generally lower when gravity plays a role. Fig. (4)
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FIG. 5: Plots of the ratio K(A)/K(0) vs l, for IA and DR.
Green line corresponds to squeezed states and homodyne de-
tection, blue line to coherent states and homodyne detection,
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parameters are ε = 0.0, V = 20, A1 = 0.2 and A2 = 0.0.
shows the key rate when AI = 0 and AII 6= 0.
The Fig. (5) and (6) represent the ratio between the non-
inertial and the inertial rates as functions of the losses, for the
various protocols. They also show some interesting features.
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Green line corresponds to squeezed states and homodyne de-
tection, blue line to coherent states and homodyne detection,
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When the reference party (Alice) is accelerating all of them
converge to various constant values which shift to lower val-
ues as the acceleration increases. In particular, DR is shown
in the Fig. (5) for the case AI 6= 0 and AII = 0.0. We ob-
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FIG. 8: Density plot of the ratio K(A1,A2)/K(0), for RR and CA, vs AI and AII . The parameters are ε = 0.0, V = 20 and
l = 0.5.
serve that the protocols with coherent states and homodyne
detection converges to the same value as the protocol with
squeezed states and homodyne measurement. If Bob is also
accelerating the plots do not converge. A general features
of the blue and red lines is that they are monotonically de-
creasing and when AII = 0 they converge to some constant
value. The green curve in DR is monotonically growing only
in the case AII = 0 and, as soon as Bob accelerates, it be-
comes decreasing at some values of the loss. In RR, when
AI = 0 and AII 6= 0, it is interesting to note that all the
protocols converge to the same value, which changes with the
acceleration, see Fig. (6). When Alice is also accelerating the
protocol with coherent states and homodyne detection moves
away from this common value but the monotonic behaviour
of the ratios does not change.
B. Collective attacks
For collective attacks we need the mutual information be-
tween Alice and Bob data
I(a, b) =
1
2
log
 V (d)ATA
V
(d)
ATA |BTB
 . (40)
Eve’s accessible information, for squeezed states and homo-
dyne detection, for DR and RR respectively, is
S(a,E) = g(λ1) + g(λ2)− g(λ(DR)3 ) ,
S(b, E) = g(λ1) + g(λ2)− g(λ(RR)3 ) ,
(41)
where now λ1,2 are the symplectic eigenvalues of (34)
λ1,2 =
√
1
2
(
∆±
√
∆2 − 4D2
)
,
∆ = r2 + s2 − 2t2 , (42)
D = rs− t2 .
Furthermore, λ
(DR)
3 and λ
(RR)
3 are the symplectic eigenvalues
of σ
(d)
B|a and σ
(d)
A|b respectively, namely
λ
(DR)
3 = s(s− t2/r) ,
λ
(RR)
3 = r(r − t2/s) .
(43)
In the same way we can write down the expressions for the
other protocols, defined in section (II B), making the substi-
tution x → r, y → s and z → t. Coherent states and homo-
dyne detection allow Eve to access the following amount of
information,
S(a,E) = g(λ1) + g(λ2)− g(λ(DR)3 ) ,
S(b, E) = g(λ1) + g(λ2)− g(λ4)− g(λ5) , (44)
where the symplectic eigenvalues are calculated to be
λ24,5 =
1
2
(
A±
√
A2 − 4B
)
, (45)
with
A =
1
r + 1
[r + sD + ∆] ,
B =
D
r + 1
[s+D] .
(46)
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FIG. 9: K(A) vs l, for CA and DR(left) and RR (right). Green line corresponds to squeezed states and homodyne detection,
blue line to coherent states and homodyne detection, red line to squeezed states and heterodyne detection. The dashed lines
are the respective key rate in non-inertial frames. The parameters are ε = 0.0, V = 20, A1 = 0.2 and A2 = 0.0.
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FIG. 10: K(A) vs l, for CA and DR(left) and RR (right). Green line corresponds to squeezed states and homodyne detection,
blue line to coherent states and homodyne detection, red line to squeezed states and heterodyne detection. The dashed lines
are the respective key rate in non-inertial frames. The parameters are ε = 0.0, V = 20, A1 = 0.0 and A2 = 0.2.
Analogously, for squeezed states and heterodyne detection we
have
S(a,E) = g(λ1) + g(λ2)− g(λ4)− g(λ5) ,
S(b, E) = g(λ1) + g(λ2)− g(λ(RR)3 ) ,
(47)
where λ4,5 are still given by the expression (46), but now with
A =
1
s+ 1
[s+ rD + ∆] ,
B =
D
s+ 1
[r +D] .
(48)
Fig. (7) and (8) show the key rates (4) for CA, normalized to
one, as a function of the accelerations of Alice and Bob, for
DR and RR respectively. We can already notice a difference
compared to IA: the degradation effect is not symmetric in
the two parties in any of the protocols. Also, the behavior
seems to be less regular. An other important difference is
revealed in Fig. (9), where the three protocols of DR and RR
with A1 6= 0 and A2 = 0 are plotted. Unlike in IA regime, for
CA the transmission length is shortened in any case by the
acceleration of either Alice or Bob. Moreover, the key rates of
all the protocols become practically zero at sufficiently high
loss whenever A1 6= 0 even in RR, whereas they are always
positive for IA. In Fig. (10) we see that in the caseA1 = 0 and
A2 6= 0, the protocols performance for RR are not strongly
affected. The plot of the ratios vs losses in RR also reveals
some interesting features. In particular, Fig. (11) shows that
the ratios for the three different protocols completely overlap
when only Bob accelerates, A1 = 0 and A2 6= 0. The plots
are growing monotonic functions and the convergence value
increases when Bob’s acceleration decreases. We did not find
some interesting regularity for DR and CA protocols and,
therefore, we do not show their plots here.
V. CONCLUDING REMARKS
We have provided a very general method to consider the
effects of gravity on several CV-QKD protocols. As expected,
the performance is mostly deteriorated when the motion is
non-inertial. Nevertheless, few results are of interest and they
underline for which QKD scheme and for which configuration
gravity is relevant. Key rates for IA and DR are caracterized
by a specific transmission length. We have found that this
length is not changed when only Alice, the reference party
of the post-processing procedure, is accelerating. If Bob’s
motion is non-inertial it becomes shorter. In RR the length
is virtually infinite in general and it becomes smaller but
never negative even when gravity is affecting the two parties.
Gravity seems to be more relevant in the case of CA. Indeed,
the transmission length is in any case shorter in DR and,
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0.0 and A2 = 0.2.
furthermore, contrary to IA, the communication length has
an upper bound even in RR when the non-reference party
has a sufficiently high acceleration. To summarize, in the
case of IA from Eve, the performance of the protocols are
not significantly changed if gravity is affecting only the
reference party. In the case of CA from Eve, this happens
only for RR. The method described here, used to incorporate
the effects of gravity on quantum information protocols, is
being generalized to the 3 + 1 spacetime and to multimode
acceleration in [28, 29]. QKD with CV would be the natural
setting to apply these new developments. Nevertheless, the
extension of our present investigation is a difficult problem
and will be the matter of a future work.
One more comment is worth. It is known, that the
key rate of CA for RR can be optimized adding properly
some noise at Bob’s side. This is possible if the noise
affects more the correlations between Eve and Bob than the
correlations between Alice and Bob. It can be implemented
including a beam splitter before Bob’s measurement, which
combine the signal with a thermal state of variance N and
additional noise referred to the input χB . It is possible to
optimize the secret key rate by correctly tuning Bob added
noise χB [8]. One might think that the effect of the vacuum
thermalization due to Bob’s acceleration, known as the
Unruh effect, would play the role of χB . Unfortunately, this
does not work because the described effect is much smaller
than the unavoidable modes mismatch between accelerating
and inertial wave packets.
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